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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 10 
Advisory Opinions 
REUBEN GOODMAN 
§lO.l. History and background. Massachusetts is one of seven 
states which provide in their Constitutions for advisory opinions.1 
Article 2 of Chapter 3, Part II of the Massachusetts Constitution, as 
modified by Amendment 85, adopted in 1964, provides:2 
Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the 
council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the jus-
tices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of 
law, and upon solemn occasions. 
The Massachusetts Constitution also contains a classic statement of 
the principle of the separation of powers. Article 30 of the Declara-
tion of Rights provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative depart-
ment shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or 
either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative 
and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: 
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. 
REUBEN GOODMAN is associated with the finn of Widett and Kruger, Boston. 
§lO.l. Colo. Const., Art. IV, §3; F1a. Const., Art. IV, §13; Me. Const., Art. VI, 
§3; N.H. Const., Pt. 2, Art. 74; R.I. Const., Amend XII, §2; S.D. Const., Art. V, 
§13. In F10rida and South Dakota, opinions may be requested only by the 
Governor. In Alabama and Delaware, advisory opinions are provided by statute; 
in North Carolina they have been given without statutory authority. See Edsall. 
The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 297 (1949). 
2 By Amendment 85, the authority to require an opinion of the Justices, fonnerly 
lodged in the Governor and Council, was expanded so that the Governor acting 
alone or the Council acting alone may now require an advisory opinion. 
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However, there is no indication that these two provisions created 
any inconsistency for John Adams, who drafted the Constitution for 
the Convention of 1780. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the 
provision for advisory opinions "evidently had in view the usage of 
the English Constitution,"s and Article 30 is a restatement of Montes-
quieu, to whom the British Constitution was "the standard, or to use 
his own expression ... the mirror of political liberty.". It has also 
been suggested that the provision for advisory opinions was viewed 
as an interim measure to cope with the initial problems in establish-
ing the government.1i 
An inconsistency between the principle of the separation of powers 
and the advisory opinion was noted in 1793 by Chief Justice John 
Jay and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in their refusal to answer a series of questions propounded by 
George Washington involving our treaties with France and our rights 
as neutrals.6 The letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, 
transmitting these questions, stated the desire of President Washington 
to know "whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of their 
advice on these questions." The Justices replied to the President: 
We have considered the previous question stated in a letter writ-
ten by your direction . . . [regarding] the lines of separation 
drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the 
government. These being in certain respects checks upon each 
other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort./ are 
considerations which afford strong arguments against tM pro-
priety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded 
to .... 
The Bench and Bar in Massachusetts in the early nineteenth century 
seem to have been troubled by the advisory opinion. Although only 
eight such opinions are reported up to 1820, the Constitutional Con-
vention of that year recommended that they be eliminated. Delegates 
to that Convention included Isaac Parker, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court., Charles Jackson and Samuel S. Wilde, 
Associate Justices, Lemuel Shaw and Levi Lincoln, who later became 
Justices, Daniel Webster, and a number of other experienced lawyers.7 
S Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 561 (1878). See Ellingwood, Depart-
mental Cooperation in State Government 31-32 (1919). This is an exhaustive sur-
vey of the advisory opinion to 1918. 
4 The Federalist, No. 47 (Madison) 313·314 (Modem Library ed.). 
Ii 2 Debates and Proceedings of Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 689 
(1853). Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1302, 1302·1304 (1956). 
6 The correspondence is set out in Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System 75·81 (1953). See William O. Douglas, We, the Judges 47·48 
(1956). 
7 Morison, History of the Constitution of Massachusetts, Appendix A to the 
Initial Report of the Special Commission on the Revision of the Constitution 48 
(1963 mimeographed), reproduced from the Manual for the Constitutional Conven-
tion, 1917, at p. 30. 
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Joseph Story, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, re-
ported, as chairman for the Committee on the Judiciary, which in-
cluded Lemuel Shaw and Levi Lincoln, that the provision for advisory 
opinions "is of very questionable utility and may lead to serious em-
barrassments."8 The report also pointed out that " ... cases of a 
more public character may be referred to the judges involving ques-
tions of general interest, of political power, and perhaps even of party 
principles ... and thus the proper responsibility of the public 
functionaries may be shifted upon judges who are called upon only 
to decide and not to act."9 There seems to have been no opposition 
to the proposal to abolish advisory opinions, and it was agreed to by 
a large majority.lo The objections to the advisory opinion are sum-
marized in the address to the people accompanying the proposed 
amendments to the Constitution: 
FIRST. Each department ought to act on its own responsibility. 
SECOND. Judges may be called on to give opinions on subjects, 
which may afterwards be drawn into judicial examination before 
them, by contending parties. THIRD. No opinion ought to be 
formed and expressed, by any judicial officer, affecting the inter-
est of any citizen, but upon full hearing, according to law. 
FOURTH. If the question proposed should be of a public 
nature, it will be likely to partake of a political character; and 
it highly concerns the people that judicial officers should not be 
involved in political or party discussions.H 
The proposed amendment was submitted to the people, linked with 
another proposal that an address by either House for removal of a 
judicial officer should require notice to the officer and hearing. This 
combined proposal was defeated, but there is no indication of the 
degree to which either proposal was responsible for the defeat. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1853 also eliminated advisory 
opinions from the revised constitution which was submitted to the 
people for ratification. The provision was reported by Marcus Mor-
ton, Sr., ex-Governor and Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, as 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which included Rufus Choate, 
Simon Greenleaf of the Harvard Law School, and Otis P. Lord, who 
later became Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court.12 Marcus Morton 
urged the elimination of advisory opinions as contrary to the principle 
of the separation of powerslS because they were given without argu-
ment and because they made it possible for the Court "to be drawn 
8 Journal of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1820-1821, p. 137. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Id. at 490. 
11 Id. at 629. 
12 Documents of the Constitutional Convention of 1853, No.4, p. 5. Among the 
delegates to the convention were Richard Henry Dana and Charles Sumner. 
13 I Debates and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 
1853 685, 693-694. 
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into the vortex of politics."14 He referred to the opinion of the Jus-
tices in 1812,15 which had advised the Governor and Council that. the 
Governor's determination, rather than that of Congress or the Presi-
dent, was controlling as to whether circumstances existed which 
required calling out the militia. He characterized this as: 
a question about which there was more excitement than there 
ever had been before or will be likely to exist for half a century 
to come. . .. [The opinion] produced an immense excitement 
in the community and . . . was arraigned throughout this State 
and throughout the United States, which opinion was reversed 
by the whole Court of the United States.16 
This advisory opinion was the legal basis upon which the Governor 
refused to cooperate with the Federal Government in the War of 
1812.17 
The revised constitution was submitted as a whole and was rejected, 
but this particular change probably was of no consequence in the 
result.18 
While no specific issue was made of advisory opinions in the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1917-1918, the judiciary was under severe 
attack. A proposal to limit the authority of the Supreme Judicial 
Court to declare statutes unconstitutional was extensively debated, 
and Professor Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard University asserted 
that there was "a widespread distrust of the judicial system."19 In the 
preceding quarter of a century the Justices had advised that the 
General Court could not empower cities and towns to sell coal 
and wood to their inhabitants;20 that trading stamps could not be 
prohibited;21 that to rent and sell homes to wage-earners was not a 
public purpose;22 that it was unconstitutional to exempt trade unions 
from liability for torts of their members;28 that it was unconstitutional 
to require prison-made goods to be so labelled;24 and that it was un-
constitutional to require a railroad to give an employee the op-
portunity to rebut information of misconduct before he could be 
discharged.211 
14 Id. at 228·229. 
111 8 Mass. 549 (1812). 
16 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 
1853 694. See Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. 6 L. Ed. 5!17 (1827). 
174 Channing. Histor! of the United States 472 (1909-1921). 
18 Ellingwood, op. cit. supra note 8, 87-88. 
191 Debates of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. 1917·1918 p. 500. 
20155 Mass. 598. 30 N.E. 1142 (1892) (lIolmes. C.J., dissenting). 
21 208 Mass. 607. 94 N.E. 848 (1911). See also 226 Mass. 613,115 N.E. 978 (1917). 
22 211 Mass. 624. 98 N.E. 611 (1912). Cf. Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing 
Authority, 804 Mass. 288. 28 N.E.2d 665 (1989). 
28211 Mass. 618. 98 N.E. 887 (1912). Cf. G.L .. c. 149, §20B. 
24211 Mass. 605. 98 N.E. 884 (1912). Cf. G.L., c. 127. §67A. enacted in 1932. 
forbidding the sale of goods made by convicts. 
25 220 Mass. 627, 108 N.E. 807 (1915). 
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One delegate to the Convention, not a lawyer, criticized an 1894 
opinion of the Justices26 that it was unconstitutional to condition 
legislation on a referendum, but he did not note that this was an 
advisory opinion. Indeed, he referred to it as a matter "decided" 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.27 This is illustrative 
of the failure of the ·public generally to differentiate between opinions 
of the Justices and decisions of the Court.. Both the Boston Herald 
and the Boston Globe of October 29, 1964, reported as a ruling of 
the Court the opinion of the Justices that the incumbent Registrar 
of Motor Vehicles could not legally hold that office. The Boston 
Traveler headline on October 28, 1964, was "Court Ousts Registrar."28 
The present lack of concern with advisory opinions as such is re-
flected in the 1964 enactment of Amendment 85 to the Constitution, 
which extends the authority to require opinions of the Justices from 
the Governor and Council to the Governor or Council. This occa-
sioned practically no discussion by either the bar or the public gener-
ally. The amendment was originally introduced into the Legislature 
in 1961, after the Council had refused to acquiesce in Governor 
Volpe's proposal to obtain an opinion of the Justices whether the 
Commonwealth could build a freeway between Weston and the pro-
posed Inner Belt in Boston. The Attorney General had ruled that 
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority had the exclusive right to 
build such an expressway, but Governor Volpe had received advice 
from other counsel to the contrary. The proposed amendment was 
approved on July 18, 1962, at a joint session of the Legislature by a 
vote of 220 to 24 and again on May 8, 1963, by a vote of 258 to 1. 
The Special Commission on Revision of the Constitution, by a vote 
of 9 to 3, 4 members not voting, recommended approval of the pro-
posal.29 The amendment was passed by a vote of 1,474,803 in favor 
and 232,701 against. The vote probably indicated a desire to give 
the Governor a freer hand vis-a.-vis the Council, rather than any con-
viction regarding advisory opinions. At the same election the people 
approved a constitutional amendment giving the Governor and other 
constitutional officers a four-year term and an initiative petition strip-
ping the Council of its statutory powers. There was apparently no 
concern, or little awareness, that Amendment Article 85, for the first 
time in Massachusetts history, gave the Council constitutional power 
to act independently of the Governor. Under the circumstances, this 
would seem to suggest public confidence that the Justices can cope 
with possible abuses by the Council of its new authority. 
§IO.2. Limitations on jurisdiction: Requests from the Legislature. 
The earlier opinions of the Justices give some indication of the mis-
givings expressed in the Constitutional Conventions of 1820 and 1853. 
26 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488 (1894). 
27 1 Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 1917-1918, p. 517. 
28 See J. B. Thayer, Advisory Opinions, in Legal Essays 58 (1908). 
29 The writer was one of the three opposed. 
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The first of these opinions was given in 178l,1 pursuant to an order 
passed by both Houses of the Legislature which "directed" the Justices 
of the Supreme Judicial Court within two days "to deliver in writing 
to each House of the Legislature . . . their respective opinions" on 
a question regarding the prerogative of the House of Representatives 
as the originator of money bills; Three of the four Justices who ap-
peared in the Senate Chamber to reply noted the very short time 
allowed for forming their opinions. Justice Sargeant said "Perhaps 
if I had heard all the arguments that have been made use of I might 
be of a different opinion." 
In 18252 the Justices gave an opinion to the House of Representa-
tives on the effect of certain legislation concerning a specific charitable 
trust upon the obligation of tenants of the trustees to pay rent. The 
Attorney General submitted to the Justices an opinion that contrary 
to the contention of the tenants, the Commonwealth had not assumed 
the obligation to make these rent payments nor absolved the tenants 
from making them. Those interested adversely to the Commonwealth 
were invited to be heard and submitted an argument. Nevertheless, 
the Justices gave an opinion "with some reluctance ... since an 
opinion given in this form without the usual hearing is liable to 
incorrectness." The Justices went on to say, "but it appearing to us 
to be a question on which according to the Constitution either branch 
of the Legislature has a right to our opinion we have performed our 
duty."8 The same reluctant compliance with a request of the Legis-
lature when private rights were involved was evidenced in 1844,4 
when the Justices gave an opinion to the House of Representatives 
on the rights and obligations of the Western Railroad Corporation 
under a special act to aid in the construction of the railroad, and 
again in 18525 when they were called on to interpret the investment 
powers of the Provident Institution for Savings under its legislative 
charter. 
It appears in these early opinions that the Justices felt they were 
bound to answer the questions asked. Justice Story expressed the 
same conviction in the Constitutional Convention of 1820. In the 
course of an argument for the elimination of advisory opinions, he 
said: "As the constitution now stands, the judges are bound to give 
their opinions if insisted upon, even in a case where private rights 
are involved, and without the advantage of an argument."6 
It was not until 18777 that the Justices for the first timeS refused to 
§10.2. 1126 Mass. 547 (1781). This opinion was found in the archives when the 
Justices in 1878 asked for material on a similar question. 
27 Pick. 125 (Mass. 1825), in a footnote ·to Adams v. Bucklin, 7 Pick. 121 (Mass. 
1828), which decided the same issue in a case between the trustees and tenants. 
8 7 Pick. at 129. 
4 5 Mete. 596 (Mass. 1844). 
IS 9 Cush. 604 (Mass. 1852). 
6 Journal of Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1820·1821, p. 490. 
7 122 Mass. 600 (1877). 
8 In 1876 the Justices ,had refused to answer one of two questions relating to the 
weight to be given by the Governor .I.lld Council, in exercising their commutation 
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honor an order of a branch of the Legislature requesting their opinion. 
They refused to answer because the question posed by the House of 
Representatives related to the tenure of a special justice, whether 
a special justice who became a member of the House thereby 
vacated his judicial position. This, the Justices said, could not be 
affected by legislative action but could be determined only in the 
course of judicial proceedings. Any attempt by the Legislature to deal 
with the tenure of this judicial officer would have been an interference 
with the judiciary and inconsistent with the separation of powers.1I 
The question was thus irrelevant to any exercise of legislative power. 
The Justices "pray[ed] to be excused from further consideration of 
the subject until it shall have been presented and argued by counsel 
in the ordinary course of the administration of justice," and a footnote 
in the report of the answer says that the House of Representatives took 
no further action. However, the answer itself does not seem to claim 
that the Justices can refuse their opinion as a matter of right. 
The next two refusals, in 1889 and 1890,10 explicitly asserted the 
right and duty of the Justices to refuse to answer the questions asked 
by the House of Representatives and invoked the separation of powers 
as a restraint on the Justices which "prohibits"11 them from giving 
their opinion except in a situation which presents an important 
question of law and a solemn occasion within the constitutional 
provision. 
Both requests were for interpretations of existing statutes. The 
Justices refused to answer, because any interpretation they might give 
the statutes could not affect the power of the Legislature to clarify 
them, or amend them, or give them whatever meaning the Legislature 
desired.12 The questions thus did not require determination to 
enable the Legislature to act, and therefore a solemn occasion did not 
exist. 
The 1889 request for an opinion asked for an interpretation of the 
then-existing compulsory education statutes as they related to private 
schools. It is a fair conjecture that the questions were controversial, 
and an interpretation by the Justices would, in the public mind, have 
placed on them rather than on the Legislature the responsibility for 
the scope of the statutes. The House of Representatives did not take 
kindly to the refusal of the Justices to answer, and it passed a resolve 
affirming its authority to require an answer to these questions.13 
power, to a recommendation by a jury that the death sentence should not be im-
posed. They said that this posed a "pure question of fact." 120 Mass. 600 (1876). 
See Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. 531 (1813), in which an opinion was refused 
to the Attorney General. 
II Cf. 237 Mass. 613, 131 N.E. 31 (1921), in which the Justices refused to deal 
with bills relating to the administration of named charitable trusts. 
10148 Mass. 623, 21 N.E. 439 (1889); 150 Mass. 598, 24 N.E. 1086 (1890). 
11148 Mass. 623,624, 21 N.E. 439 (1889). . 
12Id. at 627, 21 N.E. at 440; 150 Mass. 598, 601, 24 N.E. 1086, 1088 (1890). See 
also 126 Mass. 557 (1878). 
13148 Mass. 623, 627n. (1889). 
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The refusal of the Justices to answer the following year elaborated 
and justified their position in the 1889 refusal. They said: 
While it is our duty to render opinions in all those cases in which 
either branch of the Legislature or the Governor and Council 
may properly require them, it is not the less our duty, in view of 
the careful separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
departments of the government, to abstain from doing so in any 
case which does not fall within the constitutional clause relating 
thereto.14 
Confronted with Article 30 and the advisory opinion provision, the 
Justices asserted their right to make the ultimate accommodation 
between these two clauses. They said: 
We shall always pay great respect to its judgment that a proper 
occasion has arisen for the exercise of its power in this regard .... 
On the other hand, we cannot surrender our own judgment to 
that of the House, or of the other bodies entitled to require our 
answer to questions proposed by them, but must for ourselves 
finally decide whether the occasion contemplated by the Constitu-
tion in which our opinion may properly be required has arisen.111 
As an assertion of the principle of judicial review by a court, this 
statement seems unexceptionable. However, it is not quite so 
obvious if - as the Justices have asserted and the Court has held-
the Justices in performing their advisory function are not acting as 
a court but as individual "constitutional advisors of the other depart-
ments of Government."16 It is one thing for a court, when a case 
comes before it, to review the action of the Legislature in the exercise 
of its own powers as a body coordinate with the Legislature. It may be 
something else for a "constitutional advisor" to refuse to give advice 
to those whom the Constitution has made his clients. However, both 
the Legislature and the Governor and Council have, except in the 1889 
instance, acquiesced without question in what may now be regarded 
as settled doctrine - that the Justices may refuse to, and indeed 
"have no right to,"17 answer questions unless they satisfy them-
selves that an important question of law and a solemn occasion exist. 
"The 'Justices are forbidden to go beyond the requirement of the 
Constitution. The Constitution not only limits their duty but 
bounds their right to express opinions: "18 
14 150 Mass. 598, 601, 24 N.E. 1086, 1087-1088 (1890). 
III Ibid. 
16 Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. lI98, 400, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (19111), quoted 
in Opinion of the Justices, 1I41 Mass. 711S, 748, 167 N.E.2d 745, 750 (1960). See 
§10A infra. 
17 1I14 Mass. 767, 770, 49 N.E.2d 252, 255 (lMlI). 
18 1I19 Mass. 7111, 71111, 66 N.E.2d 1I58, 1I59 (1946), and 1I14 Mass. 767, 770,49 N.E.2d 
252, 255 (lMlI), both quoting 214 Mass. 602, 601I, 102 N.E. 644, 645 (19111). 
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Since whatever the Justices are not "require[d]" to answer by the 
advisory opinion clause they are forbidden to answer by Article 
30, they must in every instance in which their opinion is asked make 
a threshold inquiry as to their "jurisdiction."19 The limitation 
imposed by Article 30 would thus seem to preclude an opinion such 
as the Justices gave in 1924,20 in which they answered the question 
asked and specifically refrained from resolving the jurisdictional issue 
whether a question received from the House of Representatives too 
late for answer before the Legislature prorogued could be answered 
for the succeeding House. Indeed, in 1934 the Justices refused to 
give an opinion on just those grounds.2l The Justices said that 
since there was no longer any "necessity, opportunity or power for 
consideration by that legislative body . . . the solemn occasion which 
gave rise to the order had ceased to exist."22 They noted however, 
that "whether public emergencies may require an exception to this 
practice need not be considered."23 This recognizes that practical con-
siderations may enter into a determination whether an important 
question of law and a solemn occasion exist, but the determination 
itself cannot be avoided. 
The Justices have adhered to the conditions developed in the 
answers of 1877, 1889, and 1890 and have continued to refuse to 
interpret existing statutes for the Legislature on the ground that their 
opinion would have no "bearing ... upon the power and authority 
of the legislature."24 Similarly, they have refused to discuss "abstract 
legal propositions"211 and have generally confined their answers to the 
specific bills submitted to them26 and the specific constitutional ques-
tion raised.27 
The Justices have considered that the principle applicable to their 
refusal to interpret existing statutes is also applicable to questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of existing statutes. In 1919 they referred 
to the "well settled rule, from which we do not here depart, that we are 
not required to express to the General Court or either branch thereof 
opinions as to the constitutionality or construction of statutes already 
enacted."28 In that instance, however, the Justices were "constrained" 
to consider the constitutionality of the statute because pending 
191146 Mass. 787, 790, 190 N.E.2d 8711, 875 (19611). 
20250 Mass. 591, 148 N.E. 889 (1925). 
21290 Mass. 601, 195 N.E. 1I57 (1935). 
22Id. at 601I·604, 195 N.E. at 1I58. 
23 Ibid. 
241119 Mass. 7111, 734, 66 N.E.2d 358, 1I60 (1946); 226 Mass. 607, 612, 115 N.E. 921, 
923 (1917). 
211 1I14 Mass. 767, 771,49 N.E.2d 252, 255 (19411); 217 Mass. 607, 611, 105 N.E. 440, 
441-442 (1914). 
26 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I73, 1I75, 196 N.E.2d 912, 914; 1I116 Mass. 765, 770, 142 N.E.2d 
770, 7711 (1957). 
271964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I73, 375, 196 N.E.2d 912, 914; 1I1111 Mass. 7711, 782, 128 
N.E.2d 557, 563 (1955); 299 Mass. 617.618, III N.E.2d 787, 788 (1938). 
282111 Mass. 601l, 607, 122 N.E. 7611. 764 (1919). 
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amendments before the Senate were so interwoven with the statute 
that both the statute and the amendments had to be considered 
together. 
The 1919 opinion referred to a request in 1911,29 when the Justices 
had refused to answer a question posed by the House of Representa-
tives whether the civil service statute had been constitutionally 
passed over the Governor's veto. There the Legislature had it within 
its power to repeal the statute or change it regardless of its constitu-
tionality. An opinion that the statute was constitutional obviously 
would not have affected the Legislature's power over it. An opinion 
that the statute was unconstitutional would not have imposed a duty 
on the Legislature to repeal it and would not have curtailed its power 
to change it. 
However, a determination of the constitutionality of an existing 
statute may have relevance to the power of the Legislature to appro-
priate funds in connection with that statute, and, indeed, in 188580 the 
Justices answered questions as to the constitutionality of the civil 
service law passed the previous year, asked by the House of Representa-
tives, which had pending before it an appropriation bill for the ad-
ministration of that law. This opinion, however, cannot provide real 
guidance,. because it was given before the 1889 and 1890 opinions 
asserting the right and duty of the Justices to refuse to answer in 
appropriate circumstances, and this point was not discussed. 
A basic objection to opinions regarding the constitutionality of 
existing statutes in any situation would seem to be the presumption of 
constitutionality which attaches to existing law. As "constitutional 
advisors" to the Legislature, the Justices are functioning as part of the 
legislative branch. As such, they would seem to be bound by existing 
legislation until the presumption in its favor has been dispelled by 
the Court in a factual context after argument. Perhaps the Justices 
recognized this when in 1857 the Senate asked for an opinion on the 
constitutionality of the insolvency law.a1 They withheld the opinion 
for over a month and released it simultaneously with the decision of 
the Court in Dearborn v. Ames,32 upholding the law. 
§lO.3. Limitations on jurisdiction: Requests of Governor and 
Council. In general the Justices have used the same criteria in 
answering questions propounded by the Governor and Council. They 
have refused to answer abstract questions when it did not appear that 
the questions involved "pending matters in order that assistance may 
be gained in the performance of a present duty,"1 and they have noted 
that it has been customary "for the specific pending matter to be ... 
29 208 Mass. 614, 95 N.E. 927 (1911). 
80 138 Mass. 601 (1885). 
818 Gray 20 (Mass. 1857). 
82 8 Gray 1 (Mass. 1857). 
§10.3. 1211 Mass. 630, 631, 99 N.E. 286 (1912). 
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referred to in the inquiry to the end that a more intelligent and help-
ful answer be given."2 However, when the question is asked by the 
Governor and Council, rather than by a branch of the legislature, it 
is obvious that nothing so specific as a pending bill can be required 
as a basis for the question. The Justices have, therefore, often been 
willing to answer a question put by the Governor and Council on the 
assumption that the question had important ramifications in which 
the questioners were bound to become involved. This was the basis 
for their answer to questions concerning the effect of a United States 
Supreme Court decision on a large number of excise taxes,S the validity 
of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,4 and whether the governor 
could accept an appointment on the Federal Civil Defense Advisory 
Council without ipso facto vacating the governorship. Ii In the first 
two of these opinions, the Justices said that in answering they had cast 
aside serious doubts as to the right of the Governor and Council to 
ask such questions and that this was not to be taken as an indication of 
an intent to depart from the practice of requiring a "present duty."6 
Since the Governor and Council must, under the Constitution, 
approve warrants for all state expenditures, it is not difficult in most 
cases to find a present duty or at least an imminent duty. But this 
should not conclude the question whether there is an important 
question of law or a solemn occasion. This is perhaps intimat.ed in 
the opinion of the Justices of October 27, 1964,7 advising that the 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles had been illegally appointed. The 
Justices not only noted that the question involved the function of the 
Governor and Council in approving warrants for state expenditures 
but also emphasized the importance that the executive know whether 
there is a legally appointed Registrar.8 
Although at least two opinions have been given in situations in 
which the only relevant duty of the Governor and Council was the 
approval of a warrant,9 the Justices have also indicated that there may 
be a class of cases presenting questions of law which are not so im-
portant as to require the Justices to give opinions. In 1912 the Justices 
noted "the requirement for such opinions is to be sparingly ex-
ercised. . .. It is not as to any question of law that the requisition may 
be made but only important questions of law." The Justices went on 
to say that: "The Legislature has made ample provision for the 
2 Ibid. 
S 269 Mass. 611, 618·619, 168 N.E. 536, 539-540 (1929). 
4330 Mass. 713, 727, 113 N.E.2d 452, 470 (1953). 
1\ 332 Mass. 759, 762, 126 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1955). 
6 Here also it is questionable whether the Justices may in this way avoid making 
a threshold determination of jurisdiction. 
71964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1201, 202 N.E.2d 234. 
8 See 304 Mass. 681, 682, 23 N.E.2d 415, 416 (1939), in which the Governor and 
Council in asking for an opinion listed a number of reasons for the request, among 
which the need to approve warrants was listed last. 
9334 Mass. 765, 138 N.E.2d 212 (1956); 240 Mass. 616, 136 N.E. 157 (1922). 
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advice by the Attorney General as to usual legal difficulties presenting 
themselves either to the House of Representatives or to the Senate or to 
the Governor and Council."10 Thus, for example, it would seem that 
despite a present duty of the Governor and Council to pass on warrants 
for the payroll, the Justices might well refuse to answer questions pro-
posed by the Governor or the Council involving the minutiae of the 
civil service law - the validity of appointments to and separation from 
the service, the right to pay increases, etc. - which the Court fre-
quently deals with in its decisions.11 If Amendment 85, which gives 
the Governor or the Council, each unrestrained by the other, the right 
to ask for opinions, should result in a large number of such questions, 
the Justices may be compelled to draw a sharper line between those 
questions better left to the Attorney General and matters such as 
those involving the status of a Registrar of Motor Vehicles or of the 
Governor himself. 
A question which may be reopened by Amendment 85 concerns the 
right of the Governor to obtain an opinion of the Justices in connec-
tion with the exercise of his veto power. It may be significant that 
the 1913 refusal12 to give the Governor an opinion on the constitution-
ality of a bill before him for approval was not based solely on the 
use of the phrase "governor and council" in the Constitution prior to 
Amendment 85. The Justices not.ed that the circumstances in 1780 
when the Constitution was adopted - the dispersal of the Jus-
tices (two of whom usually lived in Maine) and the difficulty of 
transportation - indicated that it was not the intent of the Constitu-
tion to require an opinion on a question which, then as now, would 
have to be answered within five days. Furthermore, the history of 
Amendment 85 indicates that its immediate purpose was to permit the 
Governor to make requests for opinions without obtaining the pre-
viously required concurrence of the Council. There is no indication 
that Amendment 85 was intended to broaden the category of questions 
that could be asked. 
Since executive action is primarily within a statutory framework, 
the reasons for the Justices' refusal to answer questions involving the 
interpretation of existing statutes put by the House or Senate 
cannot apply to similar questions asked by the Governor or Council. 
The Justices have thus interpreted statutes for the Governor and Coun-
cil when answers were required in aid of the exercise of their statutory 
powers to make appointments,18 approve rules and regulations under 
10211 Mass. 630, 631, 99 N.E. 286 (1912). See G.L., c. 12, §9. In the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1853, John C. Gray of Boston argued that advisory opinions 
would no longer be necessary in view of the proposal for the establishment of an 
office of the Attorney General. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1853, pp. 687-688. 
11 But see the opinion in 154 Mass. 603, 31 N.E. 634 (1891), concerning the 
validity of the appointment of a commissioner of pilots, although this may have 
been an important post in 1891. 
12 214 Mass. 602, 102 N.E. 644 (1913). 
18323 Mass. 769, 82 N.E.2d 618 (1948); 154 Mass. 603, 31 N.E. 634 (1891). 
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statutory rule-making powers,14 issue bonds, or perform other 
functions. 11> 
Similarly, the Justices have been willing to answer questions pro-
posed by the Governor and Council involving the constitutionality of 
existing statutes, and such an opinion was given as recently as 1953, 
when the Justices advised that the statute establishing the Massachu-
setts Turnpike Authority was constitutional.16 Such opinions, how-
ever, are also open to the objection that the Justices - acting as con-
stitutional advisors to the executive, not as the Court - cannot rebut 
the presumption of constitutionality. Indeed, the Florida Justices 
have consistently refused to give the Governor opinions on the con-
stitutionality of statutes under a constitutional provision permitting 
the Governor to "require the opinion ... as to the interpretation of 
any portion of the Constitution, upon any question affecting his 
executive powers and duties" - a provision far less restrictive than 
the Massachusetts provision. In a 1915 opinion the Florida Justices 
said that "an advisory opinion of the Justices, while not binding on 
the court and open to reconsideration and revision . . . would create 
a doubt as to the effect of such a statute which the Justices on ex parte 
consideration of the subject should not bring about."17 
Opinions as to the constitutionality of statutes when sought by the 
Governor or Council raise other and more difficult questions than those 
that arise when such opinions are sought by a branch of the Legisla-
ture. Since the Justices do not answer abstract questions irrelevant 
to action, these opinions are given to the Governor or Council with 
the implicit recognition that they may refuse to execute a law which 
they are advised is unconstitutional. Otherwise, of course, such an 
opinion would be pointless. Since the opinion is merely that of 
constitutional advisors, not of the Court, any action taken by the ex-
ecutive on the basis of the opinion is on his own responsibility rather 
than on the responsibility of a Court. But if the executive has the 
right to refuse to execute a law on his own responsibility, he in effect 
becomes a law maker. Justice Black's opinion in the Steel Seizure 
Case concerning presidential power is relevant: 18 
The Constitution limits his functions in the law-making process 
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of 
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor 
equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to 
execute.19 
14 !!24 Mass. 736, 742·74!!. 85 N.E.2d 238. 244 (1949). 
15304 Mass. 681. 23 N.E.2d 415 (1939). 
16 !!30 Mass. 7l!!. 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953). The opinion in !!34 Mass. 765. 138 
N.E.2d 212 (1956), does not involve the constitutionality of a statute duly passed 
by the legislature, but rather whether a statute was properly passed - whether a 
statute existed at all. 
17 69 Fla. 632, 6!!9-640, 68 So. 851, 85!! (1915). 
18 Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, !l43 U.S. 579, 587, 72 Sup. Ct. 863. 
867, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 1167 (1952). 
19 Cf. Mass. Const., Part II. c. I, §I. Art. IV. 
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Historically, Jefferson's position that the executive as well as the 
courts may decide questions of constitutionality has not prevailed.20 
As early as 1868, Benjamin R. Curtis, a former Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court, in his defense of Andrew Johnson, conceded 
as settled that, except in the case of a direct interference with execu-
tive power, the President's duty was to execute the laws whether or 
not he believed them constitutional; his function was not to "erect 
himself into a judicial court and decide that the law is unconstitu-
tional. "21 
The 1927 edition of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations states with-
out discussion: "The right to declare an act unconstitutional is 
purely a judicial power and cannot be exercised by the officers of 
the executive department under the guise of the observance of their 
oath of office to support the constitution."22 Thus, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt complied with a rider28 directed against Robert M. Lovett 
and others, which was attached to the Urgent Deficiency Appropria-
tion Act of 1943, although he believed it unconstitutional, leaving 
them to the courts for remedy.24 
It may be significant that only one opinion has been found in which 
the Governor and Council were advised that an existing statute was un-
constitutional.25 It related to a grant of bounties to Civil War veter-
ans by.the Commonwealth, a,nd the Justices noted that the unconstitu-
tionality of such a grant had been decided in Mead v. Acton, "a case 
which arose in regular judicial proceedings and was argued by coun-
sel."26 In that instance the Justices had before them not only a statute 
presumably valid in the absence of hearing and argument, but also a 
decision of the Court, also presumptively effective, which had decided 
the very question asked and by which the Justices, acting as part of 
the executive branch, were bound. 
§IOA. Effect of opinions. The Justices have been concerned to 
differentiate between their judicial functions and their advisory func-
tions. When the Governor's message in 1960 in connection with the 
Prudential Center stated that an opinion of the Justices would assure 
its constitutionality, the Justices said:1 
20 See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, 1 Adams-
Jefferson Letters 279 (Cappon compilation, 1959). See also letter from Abigail 
Adams to Jefferson, Aug. 18, 1804, id. at 276. Jefferson's letter is reprinted in 
Freund, Sutherland, Howe, Brown, Constitutional Law, Cases and Other Problems 
15 (2d ed. 1961). 
21 Proceedings in Congressional Globe (Supp.), 40th Congress, 2d Sess., 126, 127 
(1868), reprinted in Freund et a!., id. at 18. 
22 Cooley, Constitutional LImitations 105 n.3 (8th ed. 1927), citing State ex reI. 
Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922). 
2857 Stat. 431, 450, §304. 
24 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946). 
25186 Mass. 603, 72 N.E. 95 (1904). 
26 139 Mass. 341, 1 N.E. 413 (1885). 
§10A. 1341 Mass. 738, 748, 167 N.E.2d 745, 750 (1960). 
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In this connection we quote from Commonwealth v. Welosky, 
276 Mass. 398, 400, where Chief Justice Rugg said for the court, 
"It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions, 
although necessarily the result of judicial examination and de-
liberation, are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individu-
als in their capacity as constitutional advisors of the other 
departments of government and without the aid of arguments, 
are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the 
doctrine of stare decisis." If the same question arises in the 
course of litigation, it is the duty of the court to consider it anew, 
unaffected by the advisory opinion.2 
However, the Justices themselves have recognized that this does not 
end the matter. "Opinions are accorded weight by the public and 
the profession as indicating what the law is."s Although an opinion 
does not have the force of an adjudication, "yet it is in a sense a 
prejudgment of the question proposed and would usually be followed 
by the subordinate judicial officers of the Commonwealth."4 
The distinction between the Justices as advisors and the Justices as 
members of the Court becomes particularly thin if we view their state-
ments of what the law is as "the prophecies of what the court will do 
in fact."5 On that view of the law, the Justices - when advising on 
state rather than federal constitutional law - are predicting what 
they themselves will do as members of the Court. It is small wonder 
that no case has been found deciding an issue contrary to an opinion 
given on that issue. 
Whatever the practical effect the distinction between Justices as 
constitutional advisors and as members of the Court may have on the 
use of opinions by the Court, the distinction does have implications for 
the treatment of Court decisions in an opinion. Thus, in an opinion 
holding that taxation of partnerships was unconstitutional on the 
basis of Gleason v. McKay,6 the Justices said: 
It hardly needs to be added that adjudicated cases decided by the 
court after a hearing and arguments by counsel cannot be over-
ruled by opinions rendered by the Justices under c. 3, art. 2 of the 
Constitution, when not acting as a court but as the constitutional 
advisors of the other departments of government, although such 
opinions necessarily presuppose judicial examination and 
consideration. T 
2 Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth. ~20 Mass. 2~0. 245 n.l. 69 N.E.2d 115. 
126 n.2 (1946). 
3214 Mass. 599. 60~. 102 N.E. 464. 465 (191~). 
4148 Mass. 62~. 625. 21 N.E. 4~9 (1889). 
Ii Holmes. The Path of the Law. in Collected Legal Papers 173 (1920). 
6134 Mass. 419 (188~). 
T 266 Mass. 590. 594. 165 N.E. 904, 905 (1929). See 208 Mass. 607. 94 N.E. 848 
(1911). 
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This has obvious force, but there may be a point at which a decision 
has been so eroded that it is fair to predict even without argument that 
it will be overruled. One wonders whether this was not the situation 
in 19178 when the Justices held the prohibition of trading stamps un-
constitutional. The Justices relied upon inferences from various old 
cases and opinions, which they refused to reappraise in the light of sub-
sequent United States Supreme Court cases holding such a statute 
constitutional. 
If the advisory opinion is not to be a roadblock to new legislation, 
the Justices will have to continue the approach used in the opinion on 
the validity of the historic districts in Nantucket.9 There the Justices 
did examine the development of the law to indicate that the old 
opinions limiting the purposes for which zoning and similar controls 
could be imposed would not be followed. 
§IO.5. Factual bases for opinions: General welfare legislation. 
The endeavor to give "abstractly correct answers ... without the full 
presentation of all the facts which could be brought before the legis-
lature and its committees"l is most critical when the Justices are called 
upon by the Legislature to advise on pending legislation involving 
classifications which may be discriminatory, the police power generally, 
and whether proposed expenditures are for a public purpose. 
Two recent opinions - one in 19632 and one in 19648 - point up 
the dilemma before the Justices when called upon to pass on poten-
tially discriminatory distinctions. In 1963 they were asked whether 
savings banks could be prohibited from denying savings bank life in-
surance to blind persons. They said: 
Not enough appears in the order to reveal any ground why the 
bill should apply only t,o savings bank life insurance. Surely 
there are no facts in the realm of general knowledge upon which 
we may draw as an aid .... [I]t is unsatisfactory to try to answer a 
question of this sort without adequate factual background.4 
They noted the history of this type of life insurance and its distinctive 
treatment by the Legislature, but this did not elicit any demonstrable 
justification for this particular difference in treatment,. While they 
could perceive no reason for "imposing any such disadvantage ex-
clusively upon the 'wage earners' life insurance,' II they said, "[O]n our 
present inadequate information, that is a matter of policy for the 
Legislature."5 
8 226 Mass. 613, 115 N.E. 978 (1917). 
9333 Mass. 773, 780, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1955). See 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 
563 (1955). 
§10.5. 1337 Mass. 777, 782, 150 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1958). 
2345 Mass. 780, 189 N.E.2d 849 (1963). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 199 N.E.2d 179. 
4345 Mass. 780, 781-782, 189 N.E.2d 849, 850 (1963). 
5Id. at 785, 189 N.E.2d at 852. 
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The 1964 opinion dealt with the question whether the Legislature 
could provide that Blue Cross and Blue Shield must insure subscribers 
who retired at sixty-five at the rates applicable to group plans. Again 
the Justices said: 
There is no source upon which we may properly draw for informa-
tion which would assist us in attempting to make answer. The 
missing facts surely are not matters of common knowledge .... 
Upon such slight information as we have, we are unable to point 
to anything which renders the bill repugnant to ... art. 10 of the 
Declaration of Rights.6 
This seems a quite different approach from that taken in opinions 
involving the police power generally. Thus, in an opinion in 19487 
in which the Justices held that it would be unconstitutional to prohibit 
cemeteries from selling monuments, the Justices said: "We do not see 
what evil arises."8 The possibility that cemeteries could put undue 
pressure on a bereaved family was dismissed as "fanciful rather than 
real."9 
Thus, too, in an opinion in 196210 that a $5000 real estate ex-
emption for home owners was unconstitutional, the Justices said: 
"We can see no justification for the proposed exemption ... there 
is no presumption of constitutionality."11 The view that pending 
legislation has no presumption of constitutionality, first explicitly 
enunciated in 1958,12 would seem to mean in these cases that the 
function of the Justices as constitutional advisors is not that of 
counsel trying to predict what the Court will do when the statute 
comes to it clothed with a presumption of constitutionality, but is, 
rather, that of a legislator. "What is asked for is the judge's own 
opinion."18 
However, the Justices do not always confine themselves to an abstract 
answer. When a bill is accompanied by legislative findings, the 
Justices have said that these were "entitled to weight."14 They have 
also utilized judicial notice and commission reports, "making reason-
able intendments in favor of the results of investigations by special 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 897-898, 199 N.E.2d 179, 180-181. 
T ll22 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 88ll (1948); d. ll2ll Mass. 759, 79 N.E.2d 889 (1948). 
8 ll22 Mass. at 760, 79 N.E.2d at 887. 
11 Id. at 761, 79 N.E.2d at 887. See 337 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958), and 300 
Mass. 615, 14 N.E.2d 953 (19!l8) (unconstitutional to establish hours for barber 
shops); llOll Mass. 5ll1, 22 N.E.2d 49 (19ll9) (unconstitutional to exclude married 
women from public employment); llOO Mass. 591, 14 N.E.2d ll92 (1938) (unconstitu-
tional to require electric light companies to furnish free bulbs). 
10344 Mass. 766, 181 N.E.2d 793 (1962). 
11 Id. at 769, 181 N.E.2d at 795. 
12 llll7 Mass. 777, 782, 150 N.E.2d 593, 697 (1958). See Anton's of Reading, Inc. 
v. Town of Reading, ll46 Mass. 575, 195 N.E.2d 80 (1964). 
18 J. B. Thayer, Constitutional Law, in Legal Essays 35 (1927). 
14 llSI Mass. 771, 774, 120 N.E.2d 198, 200 (1954); ll20 Mass. 77ll, 779, 67 N.E.2d 
588, 592 (1946). 
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commissions."15 Where, as in the opinion that the bill establishing 
the Historic Beacon Hill District was constitutional,16 the Justices 
through judicial notice were satisfied with the justification, they have 
been willing to give their opinion as to how a court confronted with 
this factual situation would deal with an existing statute carrying a 
presumption of constitutionality. In that opinion the Justices said: 
The announced purpose of the act is to preserve this historic section 
for the educational, cultural, and economic advantage of the public. 
If the General Court believes that this object would be attained by 
the restrictions which the act would place upon the introduction 
into the district of inappropriate forms of construction that 
would destroy its unique value and associations, a court can hardly 
take the view that such legislative determination is so arbitrary 
or unreasonable that it cannot be comprehended within the 
public welfare.17 
This was also the attitude of the Justices in a 1958 opinion18 restrict-
ing dower and curtesy. The Justices reviewed the report of the Judi-
cial Council and the experience in other states indicating the minimal 
importance of dower and curtesy. They concluded that the Legisla-
ture "may make an evaluation in the public interest, and determine 
that any slight advantage in their retention in a relatively few cases 
is outweighed by the far greater benefit to the general good accruing 
from their restriction."19 Here, too, the Justices were not attempting 
themselves to assess abstractly the importance of dower and curtesy. 
In effect they attributed a presumption to the evaluation of the 
Legislature which they predicted would prevail if the matter came 
before them sitting as the Court.20 
Facts become particularly crucial when the Justices are called upon 
to assess whether a project involving both governmental and private 
participation serves a public purpose.21 Such projects as the Prudential 
Center raise in the first instance a question whether the recitals 
are sufficient to indicate a public purpose. Thus in the first Pruden-
tial Center opinion in 1960,22 the Justices noted that the bill did not 
explicitly rely upon urban renewal and the development of open 
blighted areas, which they had declared public purposes in 1956,28 
and indeed they suggested the possibility of such reliance.24 They did 
not consider that a proposed garage - undoubtedly for a public 
15337 Mass. 800, 805, 152 N.E.2d 90, 93 (1958); 270 Mass. 593, 601, 170 N.E. 800, 
803 (1930). 
18333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955). 
17 Id. at 787, 128 N.E.2d at 566-567. 
18337 Mass. 786, 151 N.E.2d 475 (1958). 
19Id. at 795, 151 N.E.2d at 480. 
20 But see the caveat in 332 Mass. 769, 780, 126 N.E.2d 795,801 (1955). 
21340 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960); 341 Mass. 738, 167 N.E.2d 745 (1960). 
22 341 Mass. 738, 167 N.E.2d 745 (1960). 
28334 Mass. 760, 135 N.E.2d 665 (1956). 
24341 Mass. 738, 757, 167 N.E.2d 745, 756 (1960). 
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purpose25 - was itself sufficient to justify the entire Prudential project 
and held the bill establishing the Prudential Center unconstitu-
tional. When the bill was modified to make explicit that the purpose 
of the Prudential Center was to develop an open blighted area - a fact 
of which the Justices could take judicial notice26 - the Justices 
accepted the detailed legislative findings in the bill as demonstrating 
a public purpose.27 
However, the Justices were not content to rest an opinion of con-
stitutionality on the existence of a public purpose generally. They 
required that the bill contain "adequate public regulation."28 This 
involved the Justices in the detailed administrative controls over the 
project.219 Indeed the Justices in the first 1960 opinion virtually 
suggested that provisions be made for reviewing the earnings of the 
project, and for insurance, tort liability, etc.SO A reading of these 
opinions suggests that the Justices were indirectly almost participating 
in the drafting of the legislation. This type of involvement in the 
legislative process by the Justices may have worked out well in this 
case, but in other situations it may result in a loss of administrative 
flexibility which may be detrimental to a project. 
§lO.6. Conclusion. It is not easy to judge whether advisory opin-
ions have performed a useful function in preventing "the enactment 
of many measures of doubtful constitutionality which, nevertheless 
had they been enacted, might ... have become imbedded in our statu-
tory law"l or whether that itself confirms Justice Frankfurter's thesis 
that advisory opinions are "ghosts that slay."2 Any such evaluation 
would have to take into consideration the more liberal criteria for 
standing provided by the taxpayers' suitS and the mandamus action 
to enforce a public right.4 These in any event bring judicial review 
very much closer to the point at which the advisory opinion operates 
than the "case or controversy" requirement of the United States 
Constitution. The factual context of Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke 
25 Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335 Mass. 53, 1!18 N.E.2d 618 (1956). 
26 !l41 Mass. 760, 777, 168 N.E.2d 858, 869 (1960). 
27Id. at 765, 168 N.E.2d at 862. 
28Id. at 778-779, 168 N.E.2d at 869-870. Perhaps the lack of adequate administra-
tive controls explains the opinion of the Justices in 1964 that it would be un-
constitutional to provide state funds to political parties for campaign expenses. To 
relieve office seekers and office holders from the pressures of private contributors 
seems a manifest public purpose, but the bill was devoid of any administrative 
devices to see that the money was properly spent - though any such interference 
with the political process has obvious dangers. 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 197 N.E.2d 
691. 
29341 Mass. 760, 779, 780, 168 N.E.2d 858, 870 (1960). 
80341 Mass. 7!18, 758, 167 N.E.2d 745, 756 (1960). 
§10.6. 1 Address of Bentley W. Warren, Esquire, !l02 Mass. 625, 6!18 (19!19). 
2 Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, !l7 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924). 
8 G.L., c. 29, §6!1; d. c. 40, §5!1. 
4 Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 80 N.E. 821 (1907). See Kaplan v. Bowker, 
333 Mass. 455. 460. 131 N.E.2d 372, !l75 (1956). 
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Housing Authorityll (a taxpayers' suit) was not far different from that 
of an advisory opinion, and the contexts of Loring v. YoungtJ (a man-
damus action) and Dodge v. The Prudential Insurance CO.T (a declara-
tory judgment action) were hardly more concrete than that of the 
opinions of the Justices which had decided the same issues.8 
The advisory opinion may be useful in dealing with the complexi-
ties of the apportionment or initiative provisions of the Constitution9 
or with other technical questions concerning the internal structure 
of government.10 Indeed it can obviate such a situation as occurred 
in Washington, where the State had erected government buildings in 
Seattle only to be told by the court that government buildings could 
constitutionally be erected only in Olympia.ll However, when eco-
nomic and social legislation involving factual questions is at issue, the 
desirability of such opinions is more doubtful. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that opinions should not be given in this area.12 Borchard 
has favored advisory powers for the judiciary on the condition that: 
... the court would or should have complete power to refuse an 
opinion where it felt that experience of the practical operation of 
a statute, such as police power legislation, or a concrete factual 
situation was a necessary condition of reaching a conclusion .... 13 
The advisory opinion is a facet of the recurring discussion relating to 
the criteria for standing when public issues are involved.14 Ultimately, 
the degree to which seven men, appointed for life, chosen exclusively 
from one profession, III and deliberating in secret,16 should participate 
in the legislative process is as much a political question as a legal 
question and depends in part upon the confidence felt in the judiciary 
and the make-up of the Legislature. In the long run the viability of 
the advisory opinion will depend upon the limitations set by the 
II 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939). 
6239 Mass. 349, l!I2 N.E. 65 (1921). 
7343 Mass. 375,179 N.E.2d 234 (1961). 
8233 Mass. 603, 125 N.E. 849 (1920); 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960). 
9 See, e.g., 1964 Mass. Adv. She 259, 196 N.E.2d 225; 346 Mass. 791, 191 N.E.2d 779 
(1963) (apportionment); 326 Mass. 781, 93 N.E.2d 220 (1950); 318 Mass. 793, 61 
N.E.2d 825 (1945) (initiative). 
10 See, e.g., 1964 Mass. Adv. She 483, 196 N.E.2d 919 (special town meeting may 
be representative town meeting); 294 Mass. 623, 3 N.E.2d 218 (1936) (exercise of 
legislative power to assemble). But see Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 
37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924). 
11 State ex reI. Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464 (1954), discussed 
in Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 
1290 (1961). 
12 Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 297, 341 (1949). 
18 Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 73 (2d ed. 1941). 
14 Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 
1265 (1961). 
III A. Lawrence Lowell, Responsibility of American Lawyers, in Essays on Govern-
ment 125 (1897). 
16 Rodell, Nine Men 3, 4 (1955). 
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§lO.6 ADVISORY OPINIONS 115 
Justices on the questions they will answer and - as important, though 
often overlooked - on the responsibility and restraint which the 
executive and legislative departments exercise in submitting questions 
to the Justices. 
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